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Abstract: In many countries, public responsibility over the funding and provision of 
long-term care services is held at the local level. In such systems, long-term care 
provision is often characterised by significant local variability. Using a panel dataset of 
local authorities over the period 2002 to 2012, the paper investigates the underlying 
causes of variation in gross social care expenditure for older people in England. The 
analysis distinguishes between factors outside the direct control of policy makers, local 
preferences, and local policy spillovers. The results indicate that local demand and 
supply factors, and to a much lesser extent local political preferences and spatial policy 
spillovers, explain a large majority of the observed variation in expenditure.  
  
1 Introduction 
Long-term care is in many countries a local government responsibility. The case for local 
autonomy in the funding and provision of long-term care services is often argued in 
terms of the need to tailor care policies to local circumstances. The devolution of 
responsibility can help overcome informational problems by empowering local policy 
makers with direct knowledge about the needs of the local population and the local 
resources available to meet such needs. This argument is particularly relevant to long-
term care services because of the impact that environmental factors, such as the 
availability of informal care and local levels of deprivation, have on the need for formal 
support. Local care systems are also argued to reflect local values and preferences about 
the prioritisation of public resources across services and user groups, and thus to 
promote local democracy (Powell and Boyne, 2001). 
 
Countries with locally managed long-term care systems are characterised by significant 
variability in the levels and type of care services provided (Colombo et al., 2011). A 
tension exists between maximising local accountability/flexibility and universalist 
principles of equal access for equal need – or ‘territorial justice’ – whereby service 
provision is proportional to needs across areas (Boyne and Powell, 1991; Davies, 1968; 
Powell and Boyne, 2001). This tension has been somewhat addressed in a number of 
OECD countries with local long-term care systems by the introduction of national 
minimum care eligibility criteria. These criteria and other benchmarking policy 
instruments can reduce geographic disparities in state support (Colombo et al., 2011; 
Fernandez and Snell, 2014). Concerns have also been raised about possible management 
inefficiencies in highly decentralised systems and about the risk of ‘parochialism’ in 
local policy-making processes (Morgan, 2001; Trydegård and Thorslund, 2010). As a 
result, some Nordic countries have been engaged in a process of re-centralisation of 
their care system (Kröger, 2011; Magnussen and Martinussen, 2012). In addition, the 
use of performance management techniques and local targets has been concerned with 
increasing local consistency as well as with improving efficiency (Audit Commission, 
2003).  
 
A growing strand of the public economics literature is exploring the link between local 
levels of provision and strategic policy interactions between local authorities in charge 
of public services. These analyses have been justified on the grounds that care policy 
decisions generate significant externalities outside the local policy unit, and that as a 
result it is in the best interest of policy makers to take into account neighbouring care 
systems when setting local policies. Two main sources of externalities have been put 
forward.  
 
In the first, the ‘welfare competition’ strand of argument has suggested that, in some 
cases, due to the potential for local services to attract demand from outside the 
authority, local policy makers internalise the benefit levels provided in neighbouring 
authorities when setting local care policies (Besley and Case, 1995; Case, 1993). 
Otherwise, it is argued, relatively higher-spending authorities run the risk of becoming 
‘welfare magnets’, faced with excess demand for their services relative to their local 
needs and resources. Under such conditions, the incentives are for local authorities to 
join a ‘race to the bottom’ and the subsequent under-provision of public services (Sinn, 
2003).  
 
A second strand of argument has suggested that, even if welfare competition is unlikely 
to happen in the care system, strategic inter local authority behaviour might still occur 
due to informational spillovers (Revelli, 2005). The argument here relies on the fact that 
locally elected policy makers are likely to be expected by their electorate to maintain 
levels of welfare provision comparable to those in their neighbouring authorities. Also, it 
could be argued that, to the extent that geographical proximity facilitates information 
exchanges between local officials, greater similarities in care policies could be expected 
in nearby areas. 
 
Identifying the underlying causes of geographic variations is therefore fundamental to 
judging their defensibility. Local heterogeneity in care provision can be compatible with 
the goal of territorial justice if it responds to factors outside of the control of policy 
makers, such as differences in local needs and supply conditions (Powell and Boyne, 
2001). From a localist perspective, variability born out of differences between the 
preferences of local populations over the prioritisation of public services and user 
groups could also be perceived as a positive rather than negative phenomenon (Robson, 
1966). 
 
The cases for centralisation and devolution in long-term care will depend therefore on 
the extent to which local patterns of service provision can be accounted for and on the 
nature of their underlying explanatory factors. However, as yet there is limited 
quantitative evidence about the causes of local variations in long-term care services 
(Bebbington and Davies, 1993; Boyne and Powell, 1991).  
A growing literature has considered factors associated with local and regional variations 
in the provision of health care services (Morris et al., 2005; Panopoulou and Pantelidis, 
2013; Rettenmaier and Wang, 2012). Increasing attention has been been paid to the 
identification of spatial correlations in patterns of expenditure in order to explore 
interdependencies in local policy decisions. In the health care area, Moscone and Knapp 
(2007) explored local variations in mental health expenditure in England, and identified 
spatial inter-dependencies in expenditure levels between neighbouring areas. Kopetsch 
and Schmitz (2014) used spatial models to identify factors correlated with variations in 
the use of ambulatory services in Germany, and found that a considerable proportion of 
the observed regional differences remain unexplained after controlling for needs and 
supply factors, and for the presence of significant spatial interactions. Revelli (2005) 
represents the only recent significant quantitative studies investigating variations and 
spatial interdependencies in local expenditure patterns in social care. Using spatial 
regression methods, the study identified a reduction in the intensity of social care policy 
spillovers among contiguous authorities following the introduction in England in 2002 
of a central government-led performance assessment framework. 
 
The present paper builds on the methods used in this literature to explore factors 
associated with local variations in gross social care expenditure of councils with social 
care responsibilities in England (the upper-tier local authorities in England). The 
analysis focuses on (long-term) social care services, non-medical care inputs supporting 
individuals with long-term care needs arising from physical and mental health 
problems.  
 
Exploring the English case is particularly interesting because of the flexibility that local 
authorities experience when determining the coverage and intensity of the social care 
services they provide. In England, a significant proportion of funding for social care 
flows from Government on a formula basis (Darton et al., 2010). However, local councils 
also use local taxes to complement central state funds. Most grant revenue is not ring-
fenced so it can be reprioritised locally across services and service user groups. Local 
decision makers, however, also act within a national performance-monitoring 
framework whereby councils are encouraged to seek centrally determined objectives 
and performance is assessed against a range of indicators. 
 
A first aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which local variation in social care 
expenditure is due to the local environment, and in particular to local needs and costs 
differences. It therefore aims to cast light on the extent to which access to services for a 
given need varies across the areas.  
 
The second aim is to explore whether variation (beyond need and cost) is associated 
with indicators of local autonomy as exercised by councils. The paper therefore assesses 
the relationship between indicators of local preferences and differences in social care 
deployment. We consider in particular the impact of differences in political control 
between councils, and the degree to which local taxation powers allow councils local 
flexibility in determining social care spending. Finally, we seek to assess the extent to 
which local decision makers are influenced by the policy decisions of neighbouring 
councils.  
2 Analytical framework 
A theoretical model can help to clarify the relevance and inter-play of the potential 
explanatory factors of public social care provision.  Any full structural analysis of local 
authority decision making would need to model the interaction between the local 
electorate and politicians, whereby the latter is an imperfect agent of the former. Rather, 
for our purposes here, we can proceed with a simple reduced-form composite utility 
function of a social care ‘decision-maker’ in each local authority 𝑖 at time 𝑡: 
 𝑈𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡(ℎ𝑖𝑡(𝑥𝑖𝑡1,, 𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥−𝑖𝑡1), 𝑥𝑖𝑡2(𝑤𝑖𝑡) , 𝑇𝑖𝑡(𝑤𝑖𝑡); 𝜃𝑖𝑡) (1) 
where  
𝑥𝑖𝑡1  Long-term care/social care provision 
𝑥𝑖𝑡2  Other council services 
ℎ𝑖𝑡  The value of social care provision 
𝑥−𝑖𝑡1 Social care provision in neighbouring councils 
𝑚𝑖𝑡1 Local needs-related characteristics 
𝜃𝑖𝑡 (Political) preferences: higher values denoting a more Conservative electorate 
𝑇𝑖𝑡 Local council tax revenue 
𝑤𝑖𝑡 Local wealth characteristics (e.g. tax base) 
 
We would expect that provision of services increases the utility of the decision maker 
(𝑢𝑥2 > 0), but a higher taxation rate required to fund further provision reduces utility 
(𝑢𝑇 < 0). The latter effect on decision makers (local politicians) will mainly arise 
through the consequences of the ballot box.  
 
Decision makers will work to a budget constraint that sets central government grant 
income (which is a function of local needs characteristics) and local tax revenues against 
expenditure: 𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝑇𝑖𝑡(𝑤𝑖𝑡) = 𝑝𝑖𝑡1
∗ (𝑤𝑖𝑡)𝑥𝑖𝑡1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡2 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡1
∗ (𝑤𝑖𝑡)𝑥𝑖𝑡1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡2. In 
this constraint, 𝑝𝑖𝑡1
∗  are (realised) local market prices of care services, which will 
embody local care supply factors, such as prevailing wage rates (Forder and Allan, 
2014). We can safely assume that this constraint binds, and therefore we can substitute 
directly for 𝑇𝑖𝑡 in (1). The marginal effect of increased care provision is: 𝑈𝑥𝑖𝑡 =
𝑢𝑖𝑡
′ (. )(𝜃𝑖𝑡
ℎ (𝜃𝑖𝑡)ℎ𝑥𝑖𝑡1(𝑥𝑖𝑡1,, 𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥−𝑖𝑡1) + 𝜃𝑖
𝑇(𝜃𝑖𝑡)𝑝𝑖𝑡1
∗ (𝑤𝑖𝑡)). Solving for the endogenous 
variables gives a reduced-form optimal provision function of:  
 
𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝑡(𝑚𝑖𝑡, 𝑥−𝑖𝑡1, 𝑤𝑖𝑡 , 𝜃𝑖𝑡) (2) 
 
The distinctive contribution here is the specification of both spatial effects from 
neighbours and the impact of need as mediating factors on the marginal utility of extra 
care provision i.e. that 𝑢𝑥𝑖𝑡1𝑥−𝑖𝑡1 > 0 and 𝑢𝑥𝑖𝑡1𝑚𝑖𝑡 > 0. On the usual assumption of the 
concavity of the utility function, we have a standard result of higher-need areas having 
greater marginal utility of care services than areas with lower need. Exactly the same 
argument can be made for the care provided by neighbours. As noted in the 
introduction, we expect spatial effects to arise from information spillovers. The active 
encouragement of councils to ‘benchmark’ their activity relative to peers through the 
central publication of public league tables is a strong facilitator. Welfare magnet effects – 
where people with care needs are drawn to (away from) more (less) generous 
neighbour local authorities, given their need – would tend to result in different patterns 
of need locally in authority 𝑖.  
 
The use of relative need formulas to allocate central government grants (Darton et al., 
2010) will strengthen the positive relationship between provision and need. Rather than 
rely just on local preferences to meet need (acting through ℎ𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 > 0 and the disutility 
of unmet need: ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑡 < 0), higher-need areas will attract high grant revenues.
1 The use of 
both performance frameworks and funding formulas to guide local decision making is 
consistent with the concept of territorial justice.  
                                                             
1 The second order effects are: 
𝑈𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡
′ (. )(𝜃𝑖𝑡
ℎ (𝜃𝑖𝑡)ℎ𝑥𝑖𝑡1𝑚𝑖𝑡) +  𝑢𝑖𝑡
′′(. )𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡
′ (. )(𝜃𝑖𝑡
ℎ (𝜃𝑖𝑡)ℎ𝑥𝑖𝑡1𝑚𝑖𝑡) +  𝑢𝑖𝑡
′′(. )(ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑡) >
0, where 𝑢𝑖𝑡
′′(. ) < 0 by the concavity assumption, and 𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑡 > 0 due to formula funding. 
 The modelling of political preferences also produces the standard result: namely, more 
Conservative areas have a smaller marginal utility of care provision than less 
Conservative areas (comprising a direct marginal utility of service provision component 
𝜃𝜃𝑡
ℎ ℎ𝑥𝑖𝑡 < 0 and a component capturing the greater marginal disutility of the extra 
taxation required, working through the budget constraint, 𝜃𝜃𝑡
𝑇 𝑝𝑖𝑡 < 0). Both these 
individual effects stem from Conservative preferences for smaller government (after 
controlling for local wealth characteristics). 
 
The overall effect of local wealth factors 𝑤𝑖𝑡 on the marginal utility of extra care services 
will combine a number of individual effects. There will be an effect through increasing 
the local tax base and therefore allowing greater tax raising for given disutility of tax in 
the population. At the same time, local factor prices, and so service prices, will be 
strongly positively correlated with local wealth characteristics (e.g. property prices). 
Also, wealthier local populations will tend to have more Conservative (smaller 
government) preferences than poorer areas. Furthermore, central government grants – 
which are allocated on a formula basis – will give lower amounts to wealthier areas. It is 
not clear, therefore, whether a wealthier local authority will produce a net increase or 
decrease in the marginal utility of care compared to a less wealthy authority, even if we 
control for political preferences. 
 
Untangling the effects of supply will also be difficult for this reason. If the price of care 
were higher in one area than another for the same given local wealth characteristics, 
then we would expect this to mean lower demand for care in the area (e.g. if factor 
prices were independent of local wealth characteristics). But, in practice, we would 
expect factor prices to be a function of (exogenous) wealth characteristics. In the 
empirical analysis we therefore control for wealth characteristics, but we do not seek to 
directly test hypotheses about wealth effects. 
 
To summarise, we propose three hypotheses. First, that areas with higher need than 
other areas will provide more public care. Second, that through the action of 
information spillovers/benchmarking and peer-group effects on councils, care spending 
in one area should be positively correlated with that of neighbours. Third, that areas 
with more Conservative political preferences, in favouring smaller government, will 
have less public provision of services than less Conservative areas. Supply and wealth 
characteristics will also have important effects on provision rates, but we cannot 
hypothesise as to the overall direction of effect without further assumptions. 
3 Empirical specification 
 
The paper explores two empirical specifications of Equation (2), with expenditure per 
capita on care services used as the dependent variable i.e. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ . In the first 
instance, we evaluate variations in gross social care spending using a panel fixed-effects 
model as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝜃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (3) 
 
As outlined above, the term 𝑚𝑖𝑡 represents ‘need’ indicators for social care support. 
Need is determined by councils through assessment and application of eligibility rules. 
One component is the severity of a person’s condition, which leads us to include proxies 
for disability in the vector 𝑚𝑖𝑡. Another component is the availability of informal care, 
which we can model directly, although also taking account of possible endogeneity. 
Finally, the eligibility conditions include a financial means test. We therefore include in 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 measures of the wealth of the potential service user population. Accounting for 
financial need is particularly relevant because councils in England have the capacity to 
define local charging policies (within a national framework which sets maximum 
charging levels), and because of the significant differences in income deprivation across 
councils.  
 
Population wealth 𝑤𝑖𝑡 captures wealth effects for the wider local authority. Main 
empirical proxies include the local tax base, house prices and income support. These are 
also correlates for local factor prices. We explicitly model a local preferences term, 𝜃𝑖, to 
account for the differences between the parameters of the social care function of each 
council. In the estimated models, we use indicators of local political control to proxy for 
differences in local preferences across areas. 
 
The term 𝛼𝑖 identifies the time-invariant fixed effect for each area 𝑖. This term should 
account for unobserved (time-invariant) heterogeneity between councils. Similarly, we 
include time dummies 𝐷𝑡 to account for general shifts between time periods. This model 
does not explicitly include the spillover variable 𝑥−𝑖𝑡1. The panel model was estimated 
using the XTREG command in Stata 13.  
 A second empirical specification explicitly incorporates a spatial dimension. We include 
both a spatial autoregressive expenditure term (𝑦−𝑖𝑡1) to capture possible policy 
spillovers (equivalent to the effect identified by 𝑥−𝑖𝑡 in (2)) and also allow the error to 
have a spatial component (Anselin, 2002). Specifically, we implement a Spatial 
Autocorrelation model (SAC) by adding two terms to (2) to allow for spatial 
autocorrelation between contiguous authorities in the dependent variable and in the 
error term.  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦−𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝜃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (4) 
with 
𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑊𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  (5) 
 
In (4), 𝜌 represents the spatial autoregressive coefficient of gross per capita spending 
and W represents a spatial contiguity weight matrix. In (5), 𝜆 represents the coefficient 
of the spatial autoregressive error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡, and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is an independent and identically 
distributed error term.  
 
Under the SAC model, a positive and significant 𝜌 would identify a positive correlation in 
expenditure between contiguous areas, controlling for factors in council 𝑖, and could be 
indicative of policy interactions between areas. Positive values of 𝜌 would suggest 
positive spillover effects, with policy makers setting local levels of expenditure to 
approximate levels of expenditure in neighbouring areas. Positive spillovers could result 
for instance from the effect on local public expectations of service coverage in 
neighbouring areas, or through the use of joint policy planning processes. The value of 𝜆 
is of more difficult policy interpretation, as it captures the combined effect on local 
expenditure of shocks in expenditure levels in contiguous areas and the effect of 
unaccounted for spatially distributed heterogeneity. The SAC model was estimated 
using the XSMLE command in Stata 13 (Belotti et al., 2013). 
 
Descriptive statistics of variability and spatial dynamics 
 
The analysis presents descriptive statistics of local variability and spatial correlation in 
expenditure across local authorities. Standardised levels of dispersion in local 
expenditure are calculated using the coefficient of variation 𝐶𝑉𝑡 =
𝜎𝑡
𝜇𝑡
, where 𝜎𝑡 
represent the standard deviation in per capita expenditure across areas in year 𝑡, and 𝜇𝑡 
represents the mean area per capita expenditure in year 𝑡. 
 
We summarise spatial correlations using the Moran-I  spatially weighted correlation 
coefficient (Anselin, 1988). Values of the Moran-I coefficient range between -1 and 1, 
with values larger and smaller than 0 indicating positive and negative spatial 
autocorrelation, respectively. Both the Moran-I and the spatial regression models 
assumed a first-order queen contiguity matrix W to define the nature of spatial 
interaction in the dataset. 
 
Following methods used in research on earnings dynamics by Pesaran and Yamagata 
(2008), the analysis tests for the presence of spatial correlation by estimating the 
Moran-I coefficient on the residuals estimated from the panel-data model in Equation 
(3). This strategy allows the analysis to estimate the changes in the degree of spatial 
autocorrelation of local social care expenditure following the introduction of control 
variables in the model. 
4 Data 
 
Table I summarises key descriptive information about the indicators in the analysis.  
The analysis sample includes yearly data at the level of English Councils with Social 
Services Responsibilities (CSSRs) for the period 2001-02 to 2011-12, collected from a 
range of government and independent sources. Two councils (City of London and Isles 
of Scilly) were excluded from the analysis due to their very small size and widely 
recognised uncharacteristic nature. The number of councils included was also affected 
by a local authority reconfiguration during the period covered by the analysis. On 1st 
April 2009, the council of Cheshire split into two new authorities, ‘Cheshire East’ and 
‘Cheshire West and Chester’, and Bedfordshire council split into ‘Bedford Borough’ and 
‘Central Bedfordshire’. In order to ensure consistency of boundaries across the study 
period, the councils of Cheshire and Bedfordshire were imputed in the dataset post 
2009 by aggregating indicators for ‘Cheshire East’ and ‘Cheshire West and Chester’, and 
‘Bedford Borough’ and ‘Central Bedfordshire’, respectively. 
 
Table I indicates the presence of missing data in a very small number of cases for 3 of 
the indicators in the analysis. Due to the very limited extent of missing data and the 
need for a strongly balanced panel to estimate the spatial autocorrelation model, 
missing values were imputed using the IMPUTE command in Stata 13. All the models 
were therefore estimated using a panel of 1,617 observations, equivalent to 11 years of 
data across 147 councils. Whenever possible and appropriate, indicators were 
standardised by population over 65.2 Due to the skewness in the distribution of per 
capita spending, the models used log transformed per capita expenditure as the 
dependent variable. 
 
Three types of indicators (dependency, informal care support and financial need) are 
included in the analysis in order to control for local levels of social care demand 𝑚𝑖𝑡. 
Local dependency levels are proxied by the rate of uptake of Attendance Allowance 
among older people (the main universal benefit for older people with physical 
disabilities in the UK) and by the proportion of the older population aged 85 and over. 
The mediating effect of informal care on the demand for formal support is controlled by 
the rate of the population providing informal care. This indicator was derived from the 
2001 and 2011 UK population Census, and was interpolated to other years in the 
analysis. The interpolation process (i) calculated yearly informal caregiving rates for 
different age and gender groups within each authority assuming a linear change 
between 2001 and 2011; (ii) calculated changes in the population by age and gender 
groups of local councils for the years covered in the analysis, using ONS population 
estimates; and (iii) derived overall yearly estimates of informal caregiving for each area 
by factoring for each age and gender group the estimates of prevalence of informal 
caregiving by its population size.  
 
Given its role as the main source of care for people with long-term care needs, 
controlling for informal care supply is essential in order to estimate underlying demand 
for formal social care. However, problems in the estimation could arise due to the 
potential endogenous nature of the indicator. The analysis tested for the endogeneity of 
the informal care indicator in Equation (3) using an instrumental variables approach 
(Van Houtven and Norton, 2004). The results of the estimation are reported in Annex 1, 
and do not reject the null hypothesis of lack of endogeneity at the 10% level. This result 
is perhaps not surprising given the general nature of the informal care indicator used, 
which covers care provided to the whole population (including all age groups and 
                                                             
2 Several population standardisation strategies were explored for the indicator of income 
deprivation. The indicator including recipients of income-related benefits across all age groups 
was found to fit the data best. 
individuals excluded from state support by the means-test) and does not refer 
specifically to the population of potential older users of state funded care. 
 
Indicators of income (uptake of financial assistance benefits) and wealth (home 
ownership rates) are included in the models in order to capture financial need in the 
local population. In England, financial eligibility to care is defined in terms of a measure 
of ‘assessable income’, which incorporates a combination of the service users’ 
disposable income and their liquid wealth. In addition, housing wealth can be taken into 
account when determining financial eligibility for residential care services, the service 
which accounts for the majority of social care service expenditure among older people. 
Home ownership and financial assistance are therefore key indicators of likely financial 
eligibility to state support.  
 
English councils can select the level of local taxation by setting their Council Tax rates, 
which are applied to the value of the housing stock in their area. In the estimations, 
councils’ capacity to raise additional tax 𝑇𝑖𝑡 is therefore proxied using Tax Base, which 
summarises the total value of taxable property in a given council. Average house prices 
are included in the model in order to control further for local wealth 𝑤𝑖𝑡. Given the 
strong correlations between house prices and the residential care prices identified in 
previous research (see for instance Forder and Allan, 2014), house prices should also 
help control for supply-side effects, and would be expected to be positively correlated 
with local per capita expenditure levels, other things being constant. 
  
In the models estimated, local preferences are measured by dummy variables indicating 
which of the main political parties is in control of the council. The models include 
dummies for Conservative control, control by the Liberal Democrat party and no overall 
control, the reference category being control by the Labour party. Whereas local public 
preferences over care services need not be perfectly aligned with local political control, 
it is reasonable to expect a degree of correlation between public attitudes to care and 
overall political preferences. The interaction between political control and care policies 
is also justified by the close interaction that Directors of Adult Services (the local official 
with overall responsibility over social care for adults) have with locally-elected 
counsellors in English local authorities.  
5 Results 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the local authority gross yearly social care 
expenditure on older people, per older population, and pooled across the period 2002-
2012. The figure highlights the significant variability in gross social care expenditure 
per older person across English councils. Even averaged across the 11 years of the 
study, Figure 1 shows a four-fold difference in per capita expenditure. The figure also 
shows a heavy skew in the distribution of local expenditure.  
 
Figure 2 describes the extent of spatial autocorrelation (using the Moran-I coefficient) 
and of variability (on the basis of the coefficient of variation) in local expenditure for the 
11 years covered in the study. The results in Figure 2 indicate very high but declining 
levels of spatial dependence in local public per capita social care expenditure. Hence, the 
Moran-I suggests a positive spatial correlation close to 0.6 in 2002, which falls to 0.53 by 
2012. In contrast, the coefficient of variation remains broadly unchanged over the same 
period at close to 0.3. 
 
Table II summarises the estimation results for equations (3) and (4). The sign and 
significance of the effects estimated appears to be compatible with the assumptions in 
the analytical framework of the paper. Local levels of need (proxied by the receipt of 
Attendance Allowance and the proportion of older people aged 85 and over) are 
positively related to gross expenditure. In contrast, the presence of informal care 
support reduces formal social care expenditure per capita.  
 
Local indicators of income deprivation (receipt of income support and pension credit) 
and home ownership among older people appear to capture successfully the effects of 
the financial means test on potential care users. Income deprivation is thus found to be 
positively associated with public social care expenditure, and home ownership rates to 
be  negatively related. The positive and significant effect of Tax Base and local house 
prices on expenditure indicates that they capture a combination of the effect of 
increased potential tax revenue and of higher local prices on local expenditure.  
 
The results in Table II also suggest that local preferences, as indicated by local political 
control, play a part in determining local expenditure levels. In particular, areas under 
the control of the Conservative party appear to spend less, other things being equal, 
than Labour controlled authorities. The effect, which appears to be more significant in 
the SAC results, is however very small, and accounts for less than 2% of the overall 
expenditure levels observed.  
 
For all indicators, the nature and size of the coefficients is very similar across the two 
models, suggesting the spatial dependence in expenditure does not lead to significant 
biases in the coefficients, once the covariates explored are included in the model. 
Altogether, the regressors in the models account for a large proportion of the variation 
in per capita expenditure. Even excluding time dummies, the model Within R2 of the two 
models would exceeds 0.55. 
 
The results of the SAC specification indicate strong and significant spatial endogeneity of 
the dependent and error variable. In particular, the positive spatial autocorrelation of 
the dependent variable suggests the presence of interdependencies in the policy process 
between contiguous authorities. However, Figure 2 shows that once the indicators in 
Equation (3) are controlled for in the model, the level of spatial correlation of the 
residuals decreases sharply relative to spatial correlation levels for the raw indicator of 
per capita expenditure. The Moran-I for the residuals in (3) also falls through time, from 
0.37 in 2002 to 0.15 in 2012. The large reduction in the spatial dependence of the 
residuals indicates therefore that at least a significant part of the spatial dependence in 
gross per capita expenditure is linked to spatial heterogeneity in need, supply and 
wealth factors. 
 
6 Discussion 
 
Levels of per capita spending in social care for older people in England are characterised 
by substantial local variability, as demonstrated by Figures 1 and 2. Furthermore, the 
pattern of variability is significantly spatially concentrated. The results suggest, 
however, that variations in spending can be linked to a large extent to differences in key 
(rational) factors such as levels of need and supply conditions, the capacity to raise local 
revenue and to some extent local preferences. Both sets of model estimations reached 
consistently high Within R2 levels.  
 
The high explanatory power of the models overall and the significance and effect sizes 
on both the need and local wealth characteristics is an encouraging sign from the point 
of view of the objective of territorial justice, and suggests a common overarching policy-
making framework across areas. On average, public social care expenditure in different 
English councils appears to respond significantly to differences in local levels of need, a 
necessary condition for achieving equal treatment for equal need. And whereas other 
factors are also found to have statistically significant effects on local levels of 
expenditure, the size of those effects is more limited. Although we could not directly 
estimate the impact of different supply/input costs, the results suggest that these factors 
have some influence (particularly through the house price proxy).  
 
Political control – as a marker for local preferences – is found to affect local spending 
decisions. However, the analysis shows that the effect of political control, whilst 
statistically significant, is very small and accounts for less than 2% of per capita 
expenditure (after controlling for relevant factors such as local wealth characteristics). 
Given the limited nature of political control as a proxy for local attitudes towards social 
care, it is nevertheless difficult to assess whether local preferences are reflected 
insufficiently in local expenditure decisions. 
 
The results suggest strong interdependences between contiguous authorities in levels of 
expenditure. However, a significant proportion of the spatial correlation in gross 
expenditure appears to be linked to spatial heterogeneity in local characteristics, and 
the size of the correlation is substantially reduced by the introduction in the models of 
the control factors. The intensity of the spatial interdependence appears to decline 
steadily over the period of time observed, both in terms of the raw indicator of 
expenditure, and in terms of the error term 𝑒𝑖𝑡 in Equation (3). The small acceleration in 
the decline of the spatial autocorrelation from 2010 coincides with increased budgetary 
pressures in the English social care system (Fernandez et al., 2013). The patterns might 
indicate that local authorities respond to fiscal pressures by shifting their reference 
point away from neighbouring authorities, or that fiscal constraints reduce policy 
options and force policy makers to take a common set of policy decisions.  
 
From a policy perspective, it would be useful to assess the degree to which the 
correlations observed are the product of local self-determination and 'choice', or 
whether they are motivated partly at least by national performance management 
processes. Over the period studied, local authorities had the freedom to set local 
eligibility criteria to care, and to reflect their budgetary situation in their care rationing 
policies. Nonetheless, there are (anecdotal) indications that the performance 
management regime can exert pressure on councils to achieve comparable performance. 
Interestingly in the context of the findings in Revelli (2005), the discontinuation in 
England in 2008 of the existing performance management and local authorities star 
ratings system does not seem to have led to increases in the dispersion of local 
expenditure (as indicated by the coefficient of variation) or to increases in spatial 
correlation levels.  
 
Ultimately, judging the appropriateness of variations in care activity requires a 
normative judgement about the relative prioritisation of the objectives of local self-
determination and national consistency. Without attempting to resolve such debates, 
our results provide some reassurance that, whilst per capita social care expenditure for 
older people in England varies significantly across England, such variation responds to a 
large extent to factors which are compatible with principles of territorial justice. The 
results are particularly striking given the relative paucity and aggregated nature of the 
indicators available in the analysis. 
 
7 Appendix 
Insert Table III here.  
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. Dev Min Max N Source 
Gross yearly local social care expenditure on older people per older population (£) 1122.8 339.6 489.2 2820.3 1617 HSCIC 
Local per capita tax base  348.95 52.29 241.71 621.80 1609 DCLG 
Recipients of income support and pension credit (1,000s) divided by older population 556.08 263.93 159.01 1665.04 1617 DWP 
Proportion of home owners within older population  0.62 0.11 0.17 0.80 1617 ONS Census 
Proportion of the population (1,000s) providing informal care 100.71 13.35 64.77 130.07 1605 ONS Census 
Proportion of older population in receipt of Attendance Allowance  0.15 0.03 0.00 0.24 1617 DWP 
Proportion of older population aged 85 and over  0.13 0.02 0.07 0.19 1617 ONS 
Average house prices  175625 98881 40656 1087112 1617 HM Land Registry 
Proportion of older population living alone 0.34 0.04 0.26 0.52 1617 ONS 
Proportion of older population that are male 0.49 0.01 0.47 0.52 1617 ONS 
Average gross weekly pay 455.96 115.07 251.40 1366.00 1601 ONS ASHE 
Standardised Mortality Ratios 104.35 63.99 58.00 1370.85 1617 ONS 
Political control: Conservative  0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 1617 LGCEC 
No overall political control  0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 1617 LGCEC 
Political control: Liberal Democrat  0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 1617 LGCEC 
Abbreviations: HSCIC=Health and Social Care Information Centre; ONS = Office for National Statistics; DCLG = Department for Communities and 
Local Government; ASHE = Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings; LGCEC = Local Government Chronicle Elections Centre, Department of Politics, 
University of Plymouth 
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Table II. Regression results 
 
Gross local social care expenditure per older person per 
year (log) 
 
Fixed effects  
panel model 
Spatial  
autocorrelation model 
Local per capita tax base (log)  0.355*** (3.82) 0.345*** (4.38) 
Recipients (1,000s) of income support or pension credit  
divided by older population (log)  0.310*** (4.96) 0.212*** (3.98) 
Proportion of home owners within older population (log)  -0.410*** (-3.71) -0.330*** (-3.68) 
Proportion of the population (1,000s) providing informal 
care (squared)  -0.0000101** (-2.49) -0.0000110** (-3.16) 
Proportion of older population in receipt of Attendance 
Allowance  0.823*** (4.01) 0.672*** (3.95) 
Proportion of older population aged 85 and over (log)  0.158** (3.01) 0.123** (2.86) 
Average house prices (log)  0.0769** (2.79) 0.0476** (2.39) 
Political control: Conservative  -0.0149* (-1.75) -0.0150** (-2.03) 
Political control: Liberal Democrat  -0.00780 (-0.68) -0.0103 (-1.03) 
No overall political control  0.00537 (0.81) 0.00508 (0.87) 
Year is 2002  -0.172*** (-8.65) -0.108*** (-6.21) 
Year is 2003  -0.143*** (-7.94) -0.0936*** (-6.05) 
Year is 2004  -0.0874*** (-5.05) -0.0672*** (-4.90) 
Year is 2005  -0.0610*** (-3.42) -0.0587*** (-4.29) 
Year is 2006  -0.0411** (-2.34) -0.0509*** (-3.83) 
Year is 2007  -0.0427** (-2.38) -0.0521*** (-3.87) 
Year is 2008  -0.0138 (-0.84) -0.0357** (-2.91) 
Year is 2009  0.0249* (1.75) -0.0121 (-1.09) 
Year is 2010  0.0302** (2.43) -0.00508 (-0.53) 
Year is 2011  0.00127 (0.13) -0.0106 (-1.51) 
Constant 2.210** (2.97) 
  Spatial 
      𝜌 
  
0.483*** (7.97) 
  𝜆  
  
-0.386*** (-4.35) 
 𝜎𝑒
2 
  
0.00406*** (25.09) 
Observations 1617 
 
1617 
 R-squared (within) 0.60 
 
0.61 
 NB: t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.10;  ** p<0.05; *** p<0.001 
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Table III. Informal care endogeneity test results  
Local per capita tax base (log)  0.378** (3.01) 
Recipients (1,000s) of income support or pension credit divided  
by older population (log) 0.305*** (4.69) 
Proportion of home owners within older population (log)  -0.432** (-3.19) 
Proportion of the population (1,000s) providing informal care (squared) -0.0000138 (-0.98) 
Proportion of older population in receipt of Attendance Allowance  0.844*** (3.86) 
Proportion of older population aged 85 and over (log)  0.153** (2.77) 
Average house prices (log)  0.0742** (2.55) 
Political control: Conservative  -0.0146* (-1.70) 
Political control: Liberal Democrat  -0.00800 (-0.70) 
No overall political control  0.00514 (0.78) 
Year is 2002  -0.178*** (-6.05) 
Year is 2003  -0.149*** (-5.63) 
Year is 2004  -0.0917*** (-3.94) 
Year is 2005  -0.0644** (-2.97) 
Year is 2006  -0.0439** (-2.19) 
Year is 2007  -0.0445** (-2.35) 
Year is 2008  -0.0151 (-0.89) 
Year is 2009  0.0237 (1.60) 
Year is 2010  0.0296** (2.36) 
Year is 2011  0.00122 (0.12) 
Constant 
  Observations 1617 
 R-squared (within) 0.60 
 Excluded instruments: Proportion of older population living alone (linear and squared terms); 
proportion of male older people (linear and squared terms); average gross weekly pay (linear and squared 
terms); Standardised Mortality Rates (linear and squared terms) 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic): 65.455; Chi-sq(8) P-val =    0.0000 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 11.220; Chi-sq(7) P-val =    0.1293 
Endogeneity test of endogenous informal care regressor: 0.076 
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Figure 1. Distribution of local authority gross yearly social care expenditure on 
older people per older population (average pooled across 2002-2012) 
 
Source: Analysis of data from the Office for National Statistics and Health & Social Care 
Information Centre. 
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Figure 2. Spatial autocorrelation coefficient and coefficient of variation of local 
authority average yearly gross social care expenditure on older people per 
population aged 65 plus (2002 to 2012) 
 
 
 
 
